

CARL HAYDEN, SENATOR FROM ARIZONA, CHAIRMAN
THOMAS B. STANLEY, REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, VICE CHAIRMAN
EARLE C. CLEMENTS, SENATOR FROM KENTUCKY
WILLIAM E. JENNER, SENATOR FROM INDIANA
JAMES W. TRIMBLE, REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARKANSAS
KARL M. LECOMPTE, REPRESENTATIVE FROM IOWA
JAMES L. HARRISON, STAFF DIRECTOR

Approved For Release 2002/02/11 : CIA-RDP78-04718A000600070008-2

COMMITTEE ROOM
CAPITOL BUILDING, SECOND FLOOR, WEST CENTER
PHONE: NATIONAL 3120, BR. 29
ADDRESS ONLY
CHAIRMAN, JOINT COMMITTEE ON PRINTING
CARE OF U. S. SENATE P. O.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
JOINT COMMITTEE ON PRINTING
WASHINGTON

October 24, 1951

MEMORANDUM

TO: Senator Carl Hayden
FROM: James L. Harrison *JLH*
SUBJECT: THE CIA PRINTING PROGRAM

The Central Intelligence Agency, for several years, has been served by the GPO-Department of State Service Office in the production of considerable quantities of highly classified printing.

In addition to the GPO-DSSO plant, CIA for several years has also been served by their own agency plant which is equipped to produce offset and letterpress printing as well as engraving. Both of these plants are located At CIA headquarters.

STATINTL

STATINTL

Several months ago, CIA established another printing plant in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] They based this action on (a) the described need for facilities to handle increased production requirements, and (b) the need for better security although we understand that certain merchants and applicants for jobs in recent weeks have taken tours through the CIA-[REDACTED] plant which appears to reflect some doubt on the secret classification of that plant. The action was taken despite the following facts:

1. CIA is completely responsible for and have complete control over the security which is maintained in their own headquarters plant.
2. The GPO-DSSO plant is cleared for top security by CIA, Atomic Energy Commission, Department of State, National Security Resources Board and Office of Defense Management and all of these Government establishments have

expressed satisfaction with the quality, service and security maintained by the plant in connection with the work it does for them.

3. The GPO-DSSO plant has untapped production facilities and, consequently, GPO has advised CIA that this plant can handle a much larger quantity of their work. A relatively large security-cleared reservoir of skilled craftsmen exists at the GPO central plant and can be detailed to the GPO-DSSO plant whenever necessary.

4. The CIA's own headquarters plant also has considerable unused production potential.

STATINTL

5. When CIA sought priorities to purchase equipment for the [REDACTED] plant, ODM ruled that CIA was needlessly duplicating existing facilities with adequate capacity to handle their work and, on that basis, denied them priorities.

6. Subsequently, the Bureau of the Budget reached the same conclusion as ODM and advised CIA that the GPO-DSSO plant has the facilities and security to meet any of their requirements.

7. Before CIA started action to establish the [REDACTED] plant, they were specifically advised that highly skilled personnel of the type necessary to operate such a plant are scarce to the point of being almost non-existent.

STATINTL

Nevertheless, the plant was established and equipped at a cost conservatively estimated at no less than a half million dollars and we are advised that for several months now, from any practical production standpoint, it has been standing idle because of the lack of competent, qualified personnel to operate it.

25X1A

Because of this situation, CIA has adopted the only obvious method of resolving the difficulty--namely, proselyting employees from the GPO-Department of State Service Office.

It is true that if this practice were successfully consummated, the

STATINTL

██████████ plant's operational difficulties would be solved. However, the solution also would involve a broad, serious disruption with regard to the highly classified production requirements of such vital Government activities at Atomic Energy Commission, State Department, National Security Resources Board and Office of Defense Management.

RECOMMENDATION:

STATINTL

Inasmuch as there appears to be no justification established by all the known facts in support of the existence of the CIA-██████████ either on the basis of handling increased production requirements or on the basis of better security, and

Inasmuch as the loss of personnel from the GPO-Department of State Service Office would seriously impair, or possible destroy, that plant's production capacity for handling highly-classified and vitally-important printing for the Atomic Energy Commission, the State Department, the National Security Resources Board and the Office of Defense Management, and

Inasmuch as the present uncontrolled procurement of CIA's printing equipment is highly discriminatory against other agencies with equally stringent security requirements, at the same time setting a very bad example for those same agencies which are required by law to seek approval of the Joint Committee on Printing either to purchase printing equipment or to establish printing plants, and

Inasmuch as those agencies have specifically and repeatedly certified that the JCP program is helpful rather than detrimental and has imposed no difficulties with regard to their highly classified printing activities, and

Inasmuch as the CIA program is threatening to undermine the JCP policy control over the Government's printing and binding program,

Therefore, it appears most sound, practical and in the best interests of the United States Government to initiate steps which: (a) will bring CIA printing equipment procurement under the policy control of the Joint Committee on Printing and, (b) will preserve the effectiveness of the GPO-Department of State Service Office.